Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

Jack Perry v. Verl A. Jensen, Margene H. Jensen, C
and A Construction, Inc., Eric Orton : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard D. Bradford; Bradford & Brady; Attorney for appelants.
Darwin C. Fisher; Donald E. McCandless; Fisher, Scribner & Strictland, Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Jack Perry v. Verl A. Jensen, Margene H. Jensen, C and A Construction, Inc., Eric Orton, No. 950813 (Utah Court of Appeals,
1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/7035

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
"50
.A 10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF A P P ^ J ^ E T

NQ

Oiso^Ps-

CA

JACK PERRY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No.

VERL A. JENSEN, MARGENE H.
JENSEN, C & A CONSTRUCTION,
INC. and ERIC ORTON,

95-0813 CA

Argument Priority No. 15

Defendants/Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS BY
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, SR.
RICHARD D. BRADFORD
BRADFORD & BRADY, P.C.
389 North University Avenue
Provo,Utah 84601
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
DARWIN C. FISHER, 1080
DONALD E. McCANDLESS, 5313
FISHER, SCRIBNER & STIRLAND, P.C.
2969 N. University Avenue, Ste. 220
Provo,Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

LED
OCT 2 5 199B
«0URT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JACK PERRY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No.

95-0813 CA

vs.

Argument Priority No. 15
VERL A. JENSEN, MARGENE H.
JENSEN, C & A CONSTRUCTION,
INC. and ERIC ORTON,
Defendants/Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS BY THE
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, SR.

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d382 (Utah, 1962)

3

Handy v. Beck, 581 P.2d 68, (Oregon 1978)

4

Varwigv. Anderson-Bethel Porsche/Audi, Inc.,
141 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. App. 1977)

5

Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Systems, Inc.,
794 F.2d 763 (2nd Cir. 1986)

6

Committee on Children's T. V. v. Gen. Foods,
197 Cal. Rptr. 783 (Cal. 1983)

7

Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3rd Cir. 1995)

7

Florida Rock & Tank Lines, Inc. v. Moore,
365 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. 1988)

8

Freeman v. Myers, 114 S.W.2d 892 (MO. App. 1989)

9

Pelsterv. Ray, 987 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1993)
Other Sources Cited:

9

Section 533, Restatement of Torts

4, 7

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

1

CONCLUSION

12

THE APPELLEE'S "MARSHALING" ARGUMENT
MISSES THE POINT ENTIRELY
1
POINT II. JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE BY A THIRD PARTY,
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, SUPPORTS
THE CLAIM OF FRAUD
3

ii

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPELLEE'S "MARSHALING" ARGUMENT
MISSES THE POINT ENTIRELY
Mr. Perry argues in the Brief of Appellee that the Jensens failed to
marshall the evidence. However, it is abundantly clear from the argument
that the point on which Perry claims that the evidence should be marshaled
is not at all the point that the Jensens wish to make in this appeal.
The entire thrust of Perry's argument is that the Jensens have not
proved that they themselves relied upon the false statements of Mr. Perry
and therefore fraud is not proven. However, Jensens do not make that
claim. As will be shown below, the essence of the Jensen's appeal is that
Mr. Perry made false statements to third parties, intending to damage the
Jensens, and that the Jensens were in fact damaged thereby.
All other elements of fraud are also met. Mr. Perry conceded that all
other elements, aside from the reliance element, are supported by the
Court's findings and are supported by the record. (See Appellee's Brief p.
29.)
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The only evidence to which the marshaling argument would apply, in
suggesting that all evidence both pro and con should be marshaled, would
be any evidence relating to the Plaintiffs denial of having made false
statements. The fact is, there simply is no such evidence in the record
anywhere. The Plaintiff attempts to justify his deceit, but nowhere denies it.
The Brief of Appellee fails to indicate any such evidence. There simply is
no such evidence to be marshaled.
Mr. Perry proceeded to marshall evidence that the Jensens themselves
did not rely upon the false statements, asserting that therefore the fraud is
not proven.
The Jensens base this appeal on the fact that a third party, acting
reasonably and in ignorance of the falsity of the misrepresentation, did in
fact rely upon it, causing the Jensens' injury and damage.
The entire marshaling argument made by Mr. Perry can be thrown out
as it is totally inapposite to the point made on appeal.
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POINT II.
JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE BY A THIRD PARTY, UNDER THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE, SUPPORTS THE CLAIM OF FRAUD.
The Jensens counterclaimed against Mr. Perry based on the fact that,
through Perry's misrepresentation and deceit, he obtained Quit Claim Deeds
which clouded the Jensens' title forced them to defend their title in Court,
and threatened them with the loss of their property. Mr. Perry's defense is
that the statements were not made to the Jensens themselves but to other
parties, and therefore the Jensens did not rely upon the false statements.
The Jensens assert in this appeal that, provided all other elements of
fraud are present, the element of justifiable reliance is met when, as under
the circumstances of this case, a third party is deceived and the third party
acts reasonably and justifiably in reliance upon it to cause the damage to the
injured party.
Although a case such as this, of blatant, scheming deceit, rarely
reaches an Appellate Court, the principle offraudbased upon
misrepresentation to third parties is not without precedent. According to
Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah, 1962), "[i]f a personfraudulentlymakes a
misrepresentation of facts to another with the intent that it will be
3

transmitted to a third person, the latter may have a cause of action against
the misrepresentor." The logical and proper extension of this principle is
that if a person fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of facts to another
with the intent that a third person will be damaged, the latter has a cause of
action against misrepresentor. This is more clearly explained in Section
533, Restatement of Torts, which reads as follows:
The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss to another who
acts in justifiable reliance upon it if the
misrepresentation, although not made directly to the
other, is made to a third person and the maker
intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be
repeated or its substance communicated to the other,
and that it will influence his conduct in the
transaction or type of transaction involved.
Cases illustrating this principle follow.
In Handy v. Beck, 581 P.2d 68, (Oregon 1978), a Domestic water well
driller was sued for damages when oil placed on a road running in front of
the property seeped into the well, damaging the plumbing in the house and
making the well unusable. The Plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser of the
property. The lower Court held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to recover
because he failed to prove that a misrepresentation had been made
"directly" to him, or that he had relied upon the Defendant's
4

misrepresentation. On appeal, the Court held that the trial Court's
requirement of proof that the Plaintiff had relied upon the misrepresentation
conveyed to him was erroneous since, where the Defendant had both failed
to make the required disclosure in the filing log with the State Engineer and
had affirmatively concealed from the Plaintiffs predecessors in interest the
fact that the well was not cased and sealed in compliance with State
standards, thus creating a condition which injured the Plaintiff, the
Plaintiffs right to recover against the Defendant for fraud was not
dependent upon a misrepresentation being conveyed to him.
In a case involving an automobile title, Varwig v. Anderson-Bethel
Porsche/Audi, Inc., 141 Cal. Rptr. 539 (Cal. App. 1977), a Nevada dealer
sold an automobile to a wholesaler which sold it to a California dealer. The
Plaintiff purchased the automobile from the California dealer, and the
Nevada dealer subsequently caused the car to be repossessed. The
wholesale dealer argued that its representation was made only to the
California dealer and hence was not actionable by the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff alleged that the wholesale dealer represented itself to be the owner
of the automobile but knew that the representations were not true. The
Plaintiff contended that the wholesale dealer's uncontradicted declaration
5

effectively removed any issue of direct representation to the Plaintiff since
an actionable representation may be made directly as well as indirectly. The
Court, citing the Restatement Second of Torts, noted that the maker of a
fraudulent representation is subject to liability to another who acts in
justifiable reliance on it if that misrepresentation, although not made
directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker intends, or has
reason to suspect, that its terms will be repeated or its substance
communicated to the other and that it will influence his conduct.
The Jensens ask this Court to extend that principle to a situation in
which misrepresentation is made to a third party, and the third party
justifiably acts upon the misrepresentation, to the damage of the Plaintiff.
In Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Systems, Inc., 794 F.2d 763
(2nd Cir. 1986) a licensor of Movie Films misrepresented to its licensee that
it had authority to license and distribute certain films. The licensee
contracted with a sublicensee, who sued the licensor when the
misrepresentation was discovered. The Court ruled that a fraudulent
misrepresentation made with "notice in the circumstances of its making"
that the person to whom it was made would communicate it to third party
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subjects the person making the misrepresentation to liability to the third
party.
In Committee on Children's T. V. v. Gen. Foods, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783
(Cal. 1983) a class action was brought charging Defendants with fraudulent,
misleading and deceptive advertising in marketing of sugared breakfast
cereals. In its defense to the fraud claim, the Defendant alleged the
Complaint was deficient because it described the one group (the children)
who received the misrepresentations and a different group (the parents) who
purchase the product. The Court, in recognizing that Section 533 or the
Restatement Second of Torts did not precisely cover the case presented (the
Plaintiffs did not allege that the children repeated the representations to
their parents but simply expressed their desire for the product), held that it
should be sufficient that the Defendant makes misrepresentations to one
group and then intending to influence the behavior of the ultimate purchaser
and that he succeeds in his plan.
Although in a different context, the language of Committee on
Children's T. V. applies directly to the facts of the present case.
In a similar case, Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3rd Cir.
1995), the makers of a defective heart valve were sued by a patient in whom
7

the valve was implanted. The sources of the misrepresentation were letters
written by the Defendant to doctors as well as advertisements and other
promotional material. The Court concluded that the Defendant had ample
reason to expect that the patients and eventual recipients of the defective
valve implants would be affected by the information published and
distributed to doctors. That, in fact, was the Defendant's intent. The
Defendant had to anticipate that its letters and advertisements would lead
doctors to recommend, and the patients to choose, the Defendant's valve.
The fact that the Defendant initially made its representations to the doctors,
rather than directly to the patients, does not undermine the claim of fraud.
In Florida Rock & Tank Lines, Inc. v. Moore, 365 S.E.2d 836 (Ga.
1988), a gas station owner promised the gasoline supplier that he would
make payment for future deliveries of gasoline. The gasoline supplier, in
reliance upon that representation, authorized the gasoline delivery company
to make delivery of gasoline shipments. Upon the gas station owner's
failure to pay, the delivery company reimbursed the gasoline supplier and
sued the owner of the station. The Court held that the requirement of
reliance is satisfied where A, having as his objective to defraud C, and
knowing that C will rely upon B, fraudulent induces B to act in some
8

manner on which C relies and whereby A's purpose of defrauding C is
accomplished. In this case, the Court did not require a showing of a
representation made directly to the person who suffered damages from the

fraud.
There are several automobile odometer roll-back cases in which the
Court allowed recovery against the person that rolled back the odometer,
despite the fact that there were intervening owners. See Freeman v. Myers,
774 S.W.2d 892 (MO. App. 1989) mdPelsterv. Ray, 987 F.2d 514 (8th
Cir. 1993). It is only one small step, which is supported in logic and in
equity, to conclude that the reliance by a third party on a fraudulent
statement, if justifiable, supports a cause of action by the person that is
actually damaged by the fraud, particularly where the damage done was that
damage precisely intended by the misrepresentor.
Mr. Perry does not assert that the third parties, in this case Judd and
Judy Kemp and Barry Fillmore, did not rely upon the statements of Mr.
Perry. They obviously did rely upon them, since they acted in signing the
Quit Claim Deeds. Nor does Mr. Perry suggest that they were not justified
in their reliance. In fact, as it turns out, the very party that the innocent

9

third parties were intending to aid turned out to be the party that they
unwittingly injured because of Mr. Perry's misrepresentation.
The fact that the third parties were justified in their reliance is
demonstrated by the following:
1.

When Mr. Perry asked the Kemps to sign the Quit Claim Deed,

he represented that the deed was requested to take care of a minor
discrepancy about title to the property. (See Affidavit of Judd Kemp,
Exhibit "R" to Jensens' Countermotion for Partial Summary Judgment.)
(For references to the record, see exhibits attached to Brief of
Appellant.)
2.

The meeting during which the Quit Claim Deed was obtained

from the Kemps occurred late at night, and it was represented to them that
there was some urgency about the matter that required it to be done that
night. (See Exhibit "V" to Countermotion, Kemp Deposition p. 27.)
3.

Mr. Perry represented that he was already the owner of the

property in question. (See Trial Transcript pgs. 337 - 334; Countermotion
Exhibit "R," Judd Kemp Affidavit; and Countermotion Exhibit "V," Kemp
Deposition pgs. 26-31.)
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4.

Mr. Perry stated that he was attempting to clear up problems or

difficulties to allow development of the corner property (the Jensens
property) to go forward, and that he was attempting to rectify errors on
documents that Kemps had previously signed. (See Exhibit "V" to
Countermotion, Kemp Deposition pg. 29.)
5.

The Kemps were not experts in legal descriptions (Judd Kemp

Deposition p. 16, Exhibit "V" to Countermotion).
6.

Furthermore, Mr. Perry misrepresented to Barry Fillmore that

he was owner of the Jensen parcel and that he had purchased it. (Trial
transcript pgs. 350 -351; Barry Fillmore Affidavit Exhibit "S" to
Countermotion; Fillmore Deposition pgs. 15-20, Exhibit "W" to
Countermotion.)
7.

Mr. Perry concealed from Mr. Fillmore that by obtaining the

Quit Claim Deed he was attempting to obtain control over a 20-foot strip of
Jensens' property. (Trial Transcript p. 353)
There is no evidence in the record that suggests that either Kemps or
Mr. Fillmore suspected or should have suspected that Mr. Perry was
deceitful or unreliable. Therefore, there is nothing to show that their
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reliance upon Mr. Perry's representations was anything other than
reasonable and justified.

CONCLUSION
This Reply Brief addresses only new matters set forth in the Brief of
Appellee. His "marshaling" argument does not apply. The marshaling
argument argues that the Jensens should have marshaled the evidence on the
issue of Jensens own reliance. That is not the issue. The Jensens are willing
to rest their case on the principle that, provided all other elements of fraud
exist, justifiable reliance upon a misrepresentation made to a third party, is
actionable by another party who was injured. The fact of making a
misrepresentation to someone other than the injured party, when the
misrepresentation causes the intended damage, does not insulate the
wrongdoer from liability to any degree.
Because all other elements of fraud are conceded, this Court should
overrule the lower Court's findings No. 36, ("There is not evidence that
Plaintiff made any fraudulent statements to Defendants or to anyone else")
and No. 37 ("There is no evidence that Plaintiff engaged in fraudulent
conduct toward Defendant or anyone else."), enter a finding that fraud was
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committed, and remand the case back to the lower Court for entry of
judgment for the full amount of the Jensens' damages.
DATED this

day of October, JJ

"RICHARD^. BRADF)ORD/
Attorney for defendants/ Aipffellants
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